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Abstract 
The parent-child relationship is woven deep within historical and contemporary culture, but strong 
retributive ideals have led to blaming parents because of their presumed vicarious role in juvenile 
crime. The current article will discuss the history, forms, legal challenges, and empirical research 
related to parental involvement laws in the United States. The parent-child relationship provides the 
historical framework behind the separate juvenile justice parens patriae system; however, with the 
juvenile justice system not as successful as originally imagined, blame has shifted to the parents. We 
examine the potential constitutional implications of enacting and enforcing parental involvement 
statutes and ordinances and also the potential efficacy of parental involvement laws in reducing ju-
venile delinquency. In addition, we propose empirical research to test the underlying assumptions 
about blame made by parental involvement laws. 
 
The great Greek poet, Homer, is credited as saying, “It behooves a father to be blameless 
if he expects his child to be” (Toliver, 2004). This connection between the wrongs of the 
father and the wrongs of the son, or to be more contemporary, between a parent and child, 
is one that has permeated cultures for thousands of years. Across cultures and continents, 
the parent-child relationship is a staple woven deep within our philosophical and scientific 
thought, and the U.S. juvenile justice system has capitalized on this cultural emphasis. Spe-
cifically, when a minor child is adjudicated delinquent within the juvenile justice system, 
most states permit recourses against the parents. 
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Consider a recent family in Iowa—mother, Anne, and three children, Holly, Nicholas, 
and Peter (Hensler v. City of Davenport, 2010). Anne was divorced and raised the children 
on her own since they were all less than 5 years old. The children were generally well-
behaved and good students until Nicholas experienced some bullying and responded by 
socially withdrawing from school and sports. At 6′2″ tall and 200 pounds, Nicholas was 
more powerful physically than his mother when the police first cited him for a city curfew 
violation and possession of marijuana. In addition to Nicholas’s school suspension and 
referral to juvenile court, the city issued Anne a Parental Responsibility Ordinance Warning 
Letter pursuant to the Davenport Parental Responsibility municipal ordinance (Parental 
Responsibility, 2006). Despite various attempts by Anne to control Nicholas, he continued 
to break the laws and Anne received a second citation that resulted in her taking a parent-
ing class and paying for Nicholas’s drug rehabilitation program. 
Thelma Ephraim, a mother in Ohio, found herself in a similar situation when the pros-
ecutor in Maple City, Ohio, charged her with violating the city’s parental responsibility 
ordinance when her 17-year-old son was arrested and charged with illegal possession of a 
firearm and resisting arrest. In considering the city’s appeal against a municipal court’s 
judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and broad, the Court of Ap-
peals of Ohio noted that, “The data permit no firm conclusions as to whether parental re-
sponsibility laws are efficacious” (Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 2008, p. 30). In the absence 
of data, the Ohio court went on to reason that the city ordinance in question was a valid 
exercise of the city’s police power because the city claimed the law reduced juvenile crime. 
Although the Ohio Court of Appeals ultimately ruled the municipal ordinance invalid be-
cause the ordinance imposed vicarious criminal liability contrary to an Ohio state statute 
that only permitted vicarious criminal liability against organizations, part of the court’s 
opinion suggests both that: (1) empirical evidence concerning effectiveness of the law may 
have been dispositive, and (2) absent empirical evidence the court is forced to rely on con-
jecture. 
This article explores the legal blameworthiness of parents like those described in the 
two cases earlier and the dearth of empirical basis for this consanguineous legal obligation. 
This article is organized around the examination of the types, purpose, appropriateness, 
and effectiveness of parental involvement laws. As such, in our first section, we examine 
the history of the laws. Next, we detail the current types and their purposes as developed 
through legal evolution and social science research. Because of the potential penalties for 
parents, the laws may be viewed as intrusions into parents’ constitutionally protected 
rights (Tomaszewski, 2005); therefore, our fourth section will address the appropriateness 
of this method of curbing juvenile crime both through the lens of court attention to the 
laws and the blame empirical research. In our fifth section, we will expand the appropri-
ateness question by addressing how and why researchers and policy makers should be 
considering these laws. Despite the ubiquity of these laws, there has been no systematic 
empirical examination of their effectiveness, and therefore we propose using vicarious 
blame as the underlying model from which to test how well the laws work at reducing 
juvenile crime. We briefly outline future research that is desperately needed to answer 
pressing questions faced by legislators and judges who interact daily with parents and 
juveniles. 
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Historical Background for Parental Responsibility Laws 
 
Responsibility of parents to care for their children can be thought of as a historical frame-
work for the parens patriae notions behind a separate juvenile justice system. By definition, 
parens patriae means that the state acts in a capacity similar to that of a parent of a child 
who needs guardianship; the state is a “superparent” (Singer, 1998) and, like a parent, it 
can forcibly confer benefits upon people under its control. The state has the right (even 
duty) to take over where parents fail to ensure the child has a chance at growing up to be 
a law-abiding citizen (In re Vera Brown, 1904). In the early part of the 1900s, the time cor-
responding to the first juvenile court, the United States was focusing on the family as a 
cause and possible solution to delinquent behaviors by juveniles. The country was contin-
uing to learn the value of the assembly line and the integral parts of machines. Life away 
from the factories was also structured and well-disciplined (West, 1996). It appears as 
though families too were viewed as automatons; children were the cogs in the machine 
and the parents were to keep them well-oiled and maintained. If the parents did not fulfill 
this obligation, evidenced by a child who was delinquent, then the maintenance was to be 
directed at the parents. This modernist way of thinking brought about the beginning of 
parental involvement laws as we know them today in the United States. But, the connec-
tion between parents’ actions and their children’s behavior was not a new, industrialized 
phenomenon. 
A relatively cursory search of social, philosophical, and legal thought occurring through 
history reveals a foreshadowing of parental involvement laws. Clearly, historical docu-
ments suggest that parents and children have always had a certain unique relationship, at 
least to some extent. In what is referred to as the longest and best organized of the Meso-
potamian laws, the Code of Hammurabi, provides for us what this king of Babylon set 
down as the law in 1750 B.C. (Roth, 1997). In this code, it is clear that the act of having 
children altered the way the law viewed marital obligations. For instance, the Code says 
that if a man divorces his wife who “bore him children” she is to get back her dowry and 
one half of her husband’s property (p. 107); however, if there were no children then the 
husband must only restore her bride wealth and dowry. Further, the Code, which is known 
for its harsh penalties and swift judgment, demonstrates a unique relationship between a 
father and son. In the topic of disinheriting a son, the Code says that: 
 
If a man should decide to disinherit his son and declares to the judges, “I will 
disinherit my son,” the judges shall investigate the case and if the son is not 
guilty of a grave offense deserving the penalty of disinheritance, the father may 
not disinherit his son. If he should be guilty of a grave offense deserving the 
penalty of disinheritance by his father, they shall pardon him for his first one; if 
he should commit a grave offense a second time, the father may disinherit his 
son (p. 113). 
 
This notion of forgiveness and second chances toward the son for his first offense is in 
stark contrast to the punishments prescribed by the Code for other offenses such as casting 
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a wife into the water if she disparages her husband or the same penalty for a woman inn-
keeper who reduces the value of beer in relation to the value of grain (Roth, 1997). 
The Code of Hammurabi provides a 4,000-year-old example of the unique relationship 
between parents and their children. Similar examples abound throughout history. During 
its Golden Age, Egypt reflected a culture that glorified the relationship between children 
and their parents (Chambliss, 1954). The writings of the Egyptian sage, Ptahhotep, demon-
strate this with his statement, “People behave as they are taught; therefore, let a father 
converse with his children so that they in turn will converse with their own children, and 
thus will wisdom pass down from generation to generation” (Breasted, 2001). Similarly, a 
Biblical Proverb demonstrates this responsibility of the parents: “Train up a child in the 
way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it” (Proverbs 22:6, English 
Standard Version). Much later, Augustine endorsed the same Biblical notion encouraging 
parents to be mindful in the raising of their children (Schaff, 1890). Thomas Aquinas, an-
other early Catholic Church leader, fostered parental responsibility for the upbringing of 
children by encouraging parents to set a good example for their children combined with 
correction and punishment if necessary (Ostheimer, 1939). 
The Renaissance and Reformation, which brought vast cultural shifts elsewhere in daily 
life, did not bring a complete change to parent-child relationship as children continued to 
receive their primary instruction from home (Chambliss, 1954). In fact, the antiquated so-
cial thought on the family found its way into some more modern systems of law. The Eliz-
abethan Poor Laws provide one of the best and earliest examples of a modern society at-
tempting to legislate this unique parent-child relationship. These laws made poor parents 
and children responsible for each other. Likewise, the great thinkers of the time continued 
to uphold the importance of parents. John Locke, sometimes referred to as the Dr. Spock 
of the 1600s (Borstelmann, 1974), asserted the importance of a good parental example and 
admonished parents not to do anything that they would not have their children mimic 
(Yolton & Yolton, 2003). Several centuries later, the actual Dr. Spock, American pediatri-
cian and popular author in the 1940s and 1950s, was clear that parents were to make their 
children behave, and children really would not be happy unless their parents did this task 
effectively (Spock, 1957). Judge Paul W. Alexander has frequently been cited as noting in 
the late 1940s that people were beginning to discover that delinquent juveniles were trace-
able to delinquent parents and there was a desire to “curb the former by punishing the 
latter” (Alexander, 1948). 
We know that the concept of childhood has drastically changed over the years (Elrod & 
Ryder, 2005); however, the concept of the parent-child relationship has remained fairly 
static. Even with the cursory breeze through 4,000 years of civilization, the relationship 
between parents and their children appears to have been a persistent facet of culture pre-
sent in the earliest of written laws. The Greek philosopher Plato provides the best example 
of a systematic rejection of the notions of family as we know it. For Plato, the responsibility 
of being in the Guardian class would be hindered by raising children; however, he still 
believed procreation was important for the purpose of continuing the best and brightest 
genetic lines. Therefore, Plato proposed that the wives and children of the Guardians were 
to be common; that no parent was to know his own child or any child his parent (Reeve, 
2004). Albeit no respected society has ever taken Plato’s eugenics proposal seriously, 
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imagine how different our juvenile justice system would be had Plato’s Republic been the 
historical backdrop when the United States established its juvenile system. Because that is 
not the historical background, we have a system that was based on the notions of parents 
caring for their children, but when there is a failure or inability, the state steps in as a sub-
stitute parent to care for and control the child’s upbringing. 
With this parental substitution notion as its heritage, the United States created a sepa-
rate juvenile court system. Until that time, parents in the United States were given rela-
tively unbridled discretion under the law in how to raise their children (Gardner & Dupre, 
2006). In contrast, with the imposition of the separate juvenile system, the state is now quite 
involved in regulating how a child is brought into adulthood; when the parents fail in their 
duty, the state can intervene. 
The social experiment of the juvenile court brought with it a flood of hopeful reformers 
for a new juvenile system and just as many critics. The separate juvenile justice system, 
which was intended to be a parens patriae alternative to the adult system, began in Illinois 
in 1899 and quickly spread to every other state (Gardner, 2009). Adolescents were taken 
away from their parents when they were delinquent and their parents were “unequal to 
the task of responsibility of controlling and correcting” them so that the child would not 
continue to be delinquent (People v. Piccolo, 1916). 
The juvenile justice system by the 1950s was, ironically, in its adolescence: not in its 
infancy, but certainly not fully developed. Much like the experience of parents and chil-
dren during the adolescent years, the system was going through a period of great change 
and some turmoil. All of the states had some form of juvenile court, but the Supreme Court 
had not provided much, if any oversight on the decisions that were being issued in those 
courts (Gardner, 2009). The second half of the 1900s, starting with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kent v. United States (1966), was in stark contrast with the earlier laissez faire 
attitude toward the juvenile system. The new judicial oversight provided juveniles who 
were being adjudicated delinquent with a number of procedural protections that resulted 
in their adjudications closely resembling an adult criminal case. The juvenile system prior 
to this point blended together all juveniles who were in need of some court supervision. 
The courts made little to no distinction between the dispositions for those who had com-
mitted criminal acts and those who had been abused, neglected, or abandoned by their 
parents. By the 1970s, the differentiation was delineated. Children in need of services and 
status offenders were treated very differently by the juvenile system from those who had 
committed delinquent acts (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 1972). Per-
sonal accountability was placed on juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent and notions 
of punishment and paying their debts to society become common themes in their disposi-
tions. In contrast, juvenile court efforts to ameliorate the situational effects such as family 
violence were directed more toward status offenders and especially children in need of 
services (Gardner, 2009). 
In a little over 100 years, the U.S. juvenile court system has become an established seg-
ment of American jurisprudence. The state acting as the parent when the parent fails in 
those duties is the foundation of this system, but what should happen if the state fails as 
the superparent? This is not just a moot question; by many accounts the juvenile justice 
system has been largely unsuccessful (Feld, 2007). At approximately the same time, the 
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juvenile justice system was going through its first set of major jurisprudential growing 
pains with Kent v. United States (1966) and its progeny (e.g., Breed v. Jones, 1975; In re 
Gault, 1967; In re Winship, 1970), state legislators were focusing their attention on blaming 
and placing responsibility on the custodial or biological parents as a possible answer to the 
juvenile justice system’s problems. In the next section, we will describe the different forms 
of that legislative response. 
 
Current Types of Parental Responsibility Laws 
 
The idea that parents should be legally blameworthy for the actions of their children is 
certainly not new. Under common law negligent tort principles, parents could be required 
to pay for the damages resulting from the harmful behaviors of their children, but only if 
the parents’ own negligence led to the children’s behaviors. Negligent tort cases brought 
against parents for the actions of their children were difficult to prove because the plaintiffs 
were required to establish the parents’ requisite “duty, breach, causation, and damages” 
(Ihrie, 1996). Duty is the parent’s obligation to exercise care to avoid causing the sort of 
damage suffered by the plaintiff, and breach is parent’s the failure to do so (Goldberg & 
Zipursky, 2001). Damages are the harmful consequences of the parent’s actions, such as 
injury or property damage. Causation is the tricky element because the plaintiff must 
prove not that the child’s action brought about the damages, but that there was a causal 
connection between the parent’s behaviors and the harm suffered. The mere parent-child 
relationship does not satisfy the causal connection, but rather there must be some clear 
connection between the parent’s action (or inaction) and the child’s resulting harmful act 
(Tomaszewski, 2005). 
As an alternative to the common law negligence suit against a parent, the juvenile justice 
system has legislatively created three vehicles for such blame with parental responsibility 
statutes and ordinances (see Figure 1). Each form serves to formally include the parents 
when their children are adjudicated delinquent or are status offenders (Brank, Kucera, & 
Hays, 2005). The three main forms are: civil liability, contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, and parental involvement (Brank et al., 2005). Civil liability statutes, which allow a 
victim of juvenile crime to bring a civil suit against the parents of the juvenile, are basically 
strict liability, but have relatively low recovery limits—they range from a few hundred to 
about two thousand dollars (Brank et al., 2005). Because strict liability claims require no 
proof of any particular state of mind, it does not matter whether parents were careful. Civil 
liability is clearly an attempt to right the victim financially and parents are generally in a 
better place to do that than the juveniles. 
  




Figure 1. Parental responsibility laws 
 
Contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes allow for criminal charges to be 
brought against parents, or any adult, who encourages or aids in a juvenile’s delinquent 
behavior. Such criminal liability requires the actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty 
mind) that are generally found in criminal statutes (Scarola, 1997). That is, these laws can 
sanction parents and other adults when they commit intentional acts or omissions that 
advance juvenile crime. Such sanctions include fines, jail time, probation, and other op-
tions (Brank et al., 2005). 
The last form, parental involvement statutes, is much more nebulous and can prove 
intrusive into the family. Parental involvement laws often require parents to pay for the 
cost of care or encourage the parents to participate in court hearings when their children 
commit delinquent acts (Brank et al., 2005). Parents may also need to enroll in parenting 
classes, pay fines, or do community service. In fact, the options available under these stat-
utes and ordinances appear endless (see Brank et al., 2005). The options expand even more 
because the laws often also include a “contempt of court” provision that can lead to much 
harsher penalties if the parents do not fulfill the original sanctions. Parents who want to 
defend themselves are generally without recourse insomuch as these laws impose a strict 
liability—a parent is guilty by virtue of being a parent. Notwithstanding the breadth of 
these laws, enforcement of them in the United States is inconsistent at best (Harris, 2006). 
The United States has international company on the issue of parental involvement laws. 
For instance, the Anti-Social Behaviour Act of 2003 in the United Kingdom purports to 
address juvenile crime by penalizing parents of chronic juvenile offenders (Arthur, 2005). 
The act increased the number of situations that could result in parents being ordered to 
attend parenting classes/counseling and potentially pay fines. Indeed, the United King-
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dom also has a long history of placing legal responsibility on the parents for the actions of 
their children. As early as 1884 when the Reformatory School Act was enacted, parents 
could be ordered to pay for the child’s cost of care in a reformatory (Arthur, 2005). Similar 
to the United States, Australian states and territories have legislated that parents are to 
attend court proceedings, pay for the cost of detaining their child, and participate in other 
similar activities (White, 2005). 
Because each of the parental responsibility law types achieves different goals and re-
quires proofs of different elements, the justifiability and appropriateness of each are dif-
ferent. In particular, because civil liability statutes do not impose punishment, and because 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor statutes require specific blameworthy conduct 
by the parents, these two types are more jurisprudentially surefooted than are the parental 
involvement statutes and ordinances, which can impose criminal sanctions without proof 
of fault. Notwithstanding that all three types raise similar concerns regarding their social 
appropriateness; our main emphasis is on the third form—parental involvement laws. The 
next section will explore the stated and unstated purpose of parental involvement laws. 
 
Purposes of Parental Involvement Laws 
 
Legal Purposes 
All laws serve a purpose, and parental responsibility laws are no exception. Civil laws 
provide private parties a way to settle their disputes and be compensated for damages 
sustained as a result of the intentional or negligent acts of others. Criminal laws allow the 
government to punish individuals who behave reprehensibly in inflicting harm upon so-
ciety. Basic criminology teaches us that the six main purposes of punishment generally fall 
into one of two categories: utilitarian and retributive. Deterrence (general and specific), 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution are all utilitarian purposes because they ful-
fill goals that are forward-looking and desire greater societal benefits. Moral outrage and 
retribution are retributive because they serve a backward-looking purpose of punishing 
because the offender deserves the punishment. 
When Georgia legislators enacted their parental involvement statute that requires a par-
ent to appear with their child during court proceedings and bring their child before the 
court when ordered to do so (Procedure on Taking Child into Custody, 2000) they were 
concerned with sending a message of responsibility to parents. The Georgia General As-
sembly declared that the parents have a duty and responsibility to instill in their children 
a respect for the law and the consequences of failing to comply with the law (House Bill 
1299, 1996). For the Georgia General Assembly, requiring parents to appear with their chil-
dren at juvenile proceedings was consistent with such parental responsibility (House Bill 
1299, 1996) and served what they seemed to believe was a utilitarian purpose. 
In Nevada, judges have the authority to order juveniles’ parents to pay restitution to a 
victim of the juvenile’s crime (Duty of juvenile court to order restitution for certain unlaw-
ful acts; responsibilities of parent or guardian of child; community service in lieu of resti-
tution, 2011). The judge may order the parent to perform community service in place of 
the restitution if the parents’ finances are inadequate for the restitution. When the Nevada 
legislature enacted this statute in 1997, some legislators discussed the importance of send-
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ing a message to parents that they are to be a part of the lives of their children (Nevada 
Assembly Bill 39, 1997). The legislators noted that the law was intended to not only handle 
the “offending youth, but the dysfunctional family as well” (Senate Committee on Judici-
ary, 1997, p.4). One mother testified at the public hearings concerning the bill that she had 
spoken with a number of parents and children who were all supportive of imposing resti-
tution or community service on the parents (Testimony of Valerie Brown, 1997). 
Despite the stated legislated purposes of Georgia, Nevada, and other states, legal schol-
ars have argued that parental involvement laws are unfair because they do not adequately 
fit within either a utilitarian or retributive purpose (Scarola, 1997). Specifically, it is un-
known whether these laws serve the utilitarian purpose of benefiting society—if their ben-
efits outweigh their costs (Scarola, 1997). Additionally, Scarola (1997) argues that the laws 
do not serve a retributive purpose because most do not require parental culpability. 
If parental involvement laws arguably do not serve a utilitarian or retributive purpose, 
why are these laws so popular? The answer seems to be a combination of the historical 
undertones described earlier and a legislative reliance on the preponderant and widely 
known, albeit tangential, scientific knowledge of the time. Not only did the 20th century 
bring the juvenile court, but it also brought us the boom of social science and empirically 
based investigations and theories concerning the parent-child relationship.We will review 
briefly some of the more popular findings because they seem to bolster and espouse the 
rationalizations for legally imposed parental blame, even though we may question the wis-
dom of their application. 
 
Popular Social Science Purposes 
The early years of the social science movement, mainly involving Freud’s psychoanalytical 
perspective and Erikson’s lifelong stage theory of development, focused on the enduring 
effects of childhood memories, experiences, and fantasies (Erikson, 1968; Freud & Strachey, 
1962). In fact, according to Freud, all other relationships would emulate the infant and 
mother relationship. For Erikson, the early years of a child’s life and the relationship that 
child has with her caregivers (generally the parents) form a foundation for later relation-
ships and further development (Erikson, 1950). Other psychologists were also instrumen-
tal in advancing theories implicating parents in childhood development. G. Stanley Hall 
(1904), arguably the founder of the American psychological movement, summarized the 
teenage years as a time of “storm and stress” caused by physiological changes. He believed 
that parents held the responsibility to direct children’s potentially detrimental behaviors 
into positive and socially acceptable conduct. 
Bronfenbrenner (1986) described the environmental systems that influence children’s 
development and concluded that the family is the primary setting in which children’s de-
velopment occurs, and experiences of the parents, including their income and education, 
affect children’s development. Indeed, Baumrind (1972) distinguished between four dif-
ferent parental discipline styles and posited that the authoritative style, which is marked 
by parents directing their child’s behaviors in a rational manner without being too permis-
sive or too authoritarian, was the best at developing social competence in children. Albert 
Bandura’s influential work on social learning theory and modeling also emphasized the 
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role of parents in a child’s early development (1977). Bandura (1977) posited that young 
children will model their parents’ behaviors whether those behaviors are good or bad. 
In criminology, Social Learning theorists took the position that law-abiding or law-
breaking behaviors are learned from a person’s social groups, which include a person’s 
parents (Akers, 1973). Self-control theorists assume that deviant behavior is the result of a 
breakdown in conventional bonds so that parents fail in providing adolescents with the 
main attachment to law-abiding behavior (Hirschi, 1969). In Gottfredson and Hirschi’s 
(1990) General Theory of Crime, they posited that parents who have control over their chil-
dren will have children who grow up to have self-control and that self-control will allow 
the children to avoid the easy gratification of deviant behaviors. Finally, General Strain 
theory holds that certain strains or stresses increase criminal activity, with one such strain 
being parental rejection (Agnew, 2001). 
Beyond these general theories, more specific empirical work likely also influenced law-
makers’ decisions throughout the past century as they enacted and expanded parental re-
sponsibility laws. For instance, research linked parental monitoring and open communi-
cation with better grades in school (Crouter,MacDermid, McHale, & Perry-Jenkins, 1990) 
and less childhood delinquency (Caprara et al., 1998; Clark & Shields, 1997). In contrast, 
children who grow up in hostile homes are more likely to be involved in delinquent be-
haviors (Smith & Thornberry, 1995; Widom, 1989; Zingraff, Leiter, Myers, & Johnson, 
1993). In their meta-analysis, Loeber and Schmaling (1985) found several parent factors 
that predicted later delinquent involvement. The strongest of these predictors were paren-
tal rejection, lack of parental involvement, and lack of parental supervision. 
Given the popularity of historical, theoretical, and empirical arguments in support of 
the notion that the wrongdoings of juveniles are the result of faulty or inadequate parenting, 
it is not surprising that lawmakers looked to blaming parents as a viable strategy for curb-
ing juvenile crime and delinquency. However, it seems that determining the effectiveness 
of punishing and blaming parents for the behaviors of their children escaped scientific in-
quiry. A clear relationship between parents and children does not afford justification for 
blaming or punishing parents. To explain, research has demonstrated a connection be-
tween parents’ behaviors and children’s behaviors, but that connection is tenuous, at best. 
Not only are the predictive models not perfect, but any number of intervening factors, such 
as the child’s own temperament and personality, can influence outcomes. Further, even if 
there was a perfect predictive model, we do not know if punishing and blaming the parents 
will result in specific or general deterrence for either the juveniles or parents. To take this 
out of the parent-child setting, imagine a university policy that deducts from professors’ 
pay when students fail their classes. Even though educational research has clearly demon-
strated that there is a correlation between teaching and student learning, it seems syllogis-
tically irrational to punish faculty in this situation. Similarly, imposing punishments on 
parents violates legal and social principles, including culpability determinations and ap-
propriate attributions of blame. 
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Legal and Social Appropriateness of Parental Involvement Laws 
 
Legal Scholars and Court Attention Related to Legal Appropriateness 
Legal scholars have addressed one form or another of parental responsibility laws practi-
cally since their inception (Gladstone, 1954–1955) with many arguing that the laws are not 
legitimate exercises of juvenile court power because the nexus is not strong enough be-
tween bad parents and bad children (Tyler&Segady, 2000). Some scholars are especially 
critical and see parental responsibility laws as nothing more than cheap, symbolic politics 
(Tomaszewski, 2005), whereas others support at least the concept of requiring parental 
involvement (Davidson, 1996; Zolman, 1998). Others worry these laws will only continue 
to perpetrate the disadvantage of single and minority mothers (Cahn, 1996; Laskin, 2000). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of parental 
involvement laws, but a number of family law cases are relevant to our current examina-
tion. Parents are afforded a constitutionally protected interest in raising their children 
(Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923) and parental authority in child-rearing is a Supreme Court–
recognized American tradition (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972). Freedom of personal choice in 
matters of family life is a recognized fundamental liberty interest protected by the 14th 
Amendment (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982). Although the Court has also noted that parents 
should have the right to raise their children without undue government interference (Gins-
berg v. New York, 1968), there is a limit to this right. The family is not beyond regulation 
in the public interest (Prince v. Massachusetts, 1944). The metaphorical door to the family 
home is not completely closed but remains partially open depending on the circumstances 
of the family. Certainly, child maltreatment is one such circumstance that throws wide 
open the door. Juvenile delinquency, by way of parental involvement laws, may be another 
time in which the door is opened and the family subjected to more than minor regulations. 
Parents sanctioned under all three types of parental responsibility laws have been levy-
ing challenges against these laws for several decades (Kelly v.Williams, 1961). Most of the 
court attention has revolved around the parental civil liability statutes, and most often the 
courts have held those statutes constitutional (e.g., Bryan v. Kitamura, 1982) because the 
laws represent the valid state interest of compensating innocent victims (Distinctive Print-
ing and Packaging Co. v. Cox, 1989) and such compensation, arguably, may be unlimited 
(Caffiero v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Ed., 1981; but see Owens v. Ivey, 1988). 
Because the parental involvement type laws are newer and, we believe, on shakier legal 
ground, we will focus our attention on some cases that have addressed laws that essentially 
criminalize being a “bad parent” by mandating, for example, that a “parent of a minor 
shall not fail to exercise reasonable control over said minor” (Davenport Mun. Code 
§ 9.56.010, 2006). 
In an early case, Doe v. City of Trenton (1976), the court addressed a Trenton, New Jer-
sey, ordinance that stated if a minor was charged and adjudicated delinquent for violating 
public peace twice in a year, “it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal . . . that the parents . . . 
allowed, permitted or suffered [the] minor to commit a violation of the public peace.” Al-
though the ordinance technically required parental fault, it allowed such fault to be pre-
sumed from the existence of prior delinquencies of a minor. Legal presumptions are un-
constitutional if they are “irrational” or “arbitrary,” and therefore, for a presumption to be 
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constitutional, a proven fact must give the “substantial assurance” that the presumed fact 
more likely than not flowed from the proven fact (Leary v. United States, 1969). In finding 
the ordinance unconstitutional, the New Jersey court reasoned that the causes of juvenile 
misconduct are “complex and imperfectly understood” (Leary v. United States, 1969, p. 132), 
and because the city provided no evidence that parental influence is an overriding cause 
of juvenile misconduct, it cannot be said that the “presumed fact in the Trenton ordinance 
(parental responsibility for delinquent acts of the child) [flowed] naturally from the proved 
fact (a second adjudication within one year)” (Doe v. City of Trenton, 1976, p. 133). 
More recently, the courts have been similarly unsupportive of parental involvement 
laws but not for constitutional reasons. Two cases in Ohio demonstrate this well. First, in 
Struthers v. Ardale (2000), a father successfully argued that a parental involvement charge 
brought against him did not inform him of the elements of the crime or the specific nature 
of his crime. As a result of his son’s truancy, the father received a citation that stated, “On 
3–22, 1999, at Struthers High School Struthers Ohio you violated parental responsibility 
Ord. #97–9562” (Struthers v. Ardale, 2000, p.1). The court ordered the father to pay a $20 
fine and pay court costs. On appeal, the father successfully argued that the citation he re-
ceived did not inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The court 
avoided the father’s other argument that the city’s ordinance requiring “No parent or 
guardian of any minor child under the age of eighteen years shall fail to exercise reasonable 
control over said minor” (Struthers v. Ardale, 2000, p. 1) should be void for vagueness. 
The second Ohio case similarly circumvented a constitutional argument but still struck 
down a parental involvement statute for being in conflict with state law (Maple Heights v. 
Ephraim, 2008). In Maple Heights, a parent commits the “offense of failing to supervise a 
minor if . . . the child has committed a status offense, unruly act or a delinquent act that 
would be a misdemeanor or felony of any degree if committed by an adult” (Maple 
Heights v. Ephraim, 2008, p. 442). The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the Maple Heights’ 
parental involvement ordinance was in conflict with not only the common law disapproval 
of vicarious criminal responsibility but also with Ohio’s statutory prohibition of vicarious 
criminal liability on individuals. 
In Michigan, the state ordered parents to pay over $700,000 in restitution (a criminal 
sanction) after their son vandalized and set several fires in a high school (In re McEvoy, 
2005). The parents argued unsuccessfully that permitting an unlimited amount of restitu-
tion without showing of parental fault unconstitutionally deprived them of substantive 
due process. The court reasoned that the statute did include a parental fault consideration 
because the law is imposed only against those parents who had “supervisory responsibil-
ity for the juvenile at the time of the [illegal] acts” (In re McEvoy, 2005, pp. 69–70). The 
parents also unsuccessfully argued that the parental involvement statute acted as a bill of 
attainder. A bill of attainder is a law that circumvents the judicial function and simply 
punishes a specifically designated person or group. Bill of attainders have been described 
as “trial by legislature,” the implication being that the laws so specifically targets a specific 
person or group that there is nothing left for the courts to do (United States v. Brown, 1965). 
In this instance, parents’ paying restitution was based on their status of being parents. The 
court rejected this argument by reasoning that the required punishment element was miss-
ing. The court reasoned that “the mere fact that harm is inflicted by the government does 
B R A N K  A N D  S C O T T ,  S O C I A L  I S S U E S  A N D  P O L I C Y  R E V I E W  6  (2 0 1 2 )  
13 
not make it punishment” (In re McEvoy, 2005, p. 73). Moreover, even though restitution is 
meant to cause “financial pain” it is not automatically punishment (In re McEvoy, 2005, p. 73). 
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a parental involvement ordinance 
was arbitrary and irrational (Hensler v. City of Davenport, 2010). In Davenport, Iowa, a 
parent fails “to exercise reasonable parental control” over a minor if there is a second “oc-
currence” or “adjudication” or “entry of informal adjustment” related to any unlawful act 
by the minor. An “occurrence” means that a law enforcement agency had probable cause 
that the minor is delinquent and takes the minor into custody. The existence of this pre-
sumption clause saved the city the burden of proving that the parent failed to exercise 
reasonable control and that failure caused the “occurrence.” The Supreme Court of Iowa 
held that such a presumption was irrational and arbitrary because juvenile delinquency 
can be caused by many different factors, and experts fail to agree on the causes of delin-
quency (Hensler v. City of Davenport, 2010). The court therefore struck down this provi-
sion of the ordinance, but preserved the other provisions of the ordinance that did not 
offend the due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution (Hensler v. City of Davenport, 
2010). In rejecting the parent’s claim that the law unconstitutionally infringed on her pa-
rental rights, the court held that “while the ordinance does attempt to inform parents about 
their child’s delinquency, provide skills for combating delinquency, and ultimately im-
poses sanctions on parents for their child’s continued delinquency, we cannot say the city 
has improperly intervened and substituted its decision making for that of the parent” 
(Hensler v. City of Davenport, 2010, p. 9) This tautological reasoning, however, seems to 
reach a conclusion that is inconsistent with the premise upon which it is based. Specifically, 
if the government is subjecting parents to criminal penalty for failing to properly imple-
ment the parenting skills required by the government, then the government is indeed sub-
stituting its decision making for that of the parents. 
The preceding recent cases demonstrate that courts are more willing to enforce civil 
liability ordinances than they are to enforce parental involvement ordinances. Courts often 
attack the constitutional issues head-on in the civil liability cases but more often avoid 
those difficult constitutional issues for parental involvement laws. The difference in ap-
proaches could be the result of a conflict between lay people and legislators’ desire to 
blame parents and the limits imposed by the United States and state Constitutions on pun-
ishing people who did not engage in blameworthy conduct. By striking down statutes on 
grounds unrelated to the Constitution, courts do not have to publicly proclaim that the-
Constitution prohibits us from compelling good parenting through threat of legal sanction. 
Analyzing these laws under constitutional doctrines could force the government to prove 
that these laws work and are narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s goal. Based on the 
current lack of research on the effectiveness of these laws, it is unlikely that the government 
would be able to prove its case. Our next section attends specifically to the kinds of empir-
ical research that are needed. 
 
Empirical Research Related to Social Appropriateness 
We discussed earlier the historical background of parental involvement laws and the pos-
sible theoretical and empirical reasons for targeting parents in the attempt to remedy and 
discourage juvenile delinquency. As stated earlier, parental responsibility laws can be 
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organized into three types: civil liability, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and 
parental involvement statutes (see Table 1). Although each of these types serves different 
purposes, the ultimate effect of the laws is to saddle parents with the burden of rectifying 
the harms of their children. Perceptions of the social appropriateness of parental responsi-
bility laws generally, and parental involvement laws more specifically, might therefore be 
based on people’s implicit notions of blame. 
 
Table 1. Examples of Parental Responsibility Laws 
Type Example Law 
Civil Liability Idaho § 6-210, “Any person shall be entitled to recover damages in an 
amount not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in a 
court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any minor, under the 
age of eighteen (18) years, living with the parents, who shall willfully cause 
economic loss to such person . . .” 
Criminal Liability/Contributing 
   to the Delinquency 
Mississippi § 97-5-39, “. . . any parent . . . who willfully commits any act 
or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission contributes 
to or tends to contribute to the neglect or delinquency of any child . . . shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a 
fine not to exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by imprisonment 
not to exceed one (1) year in jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” 
General Involvement Nebraska § 43-290, “to promote parental responsibility and to provide for 
the most equitable use and availability of public money . . . the court may 
order and decree that the parent shall pay, in such manner as the court 
may direct, a reasonable sum that will cover in whole or part the support, 
study, and treatment of the juvenile, which amount ordered paid shall be 
the extent of the liability of the parent.” 
 
Assignment of blame to parents is bolstered, although arguably illogically, by psycho-
logical theories and empirical findings that parents’ actions influence children’s behaviors. 
Therefore blame, in contrast to responsibility and culpability (Shaver & Drown, 1986), is 
the logical first step in examining the social appropriateness of parental involvement laws 
because these laws uniquely use blame. Blame involves evaluating a person negatively; 
responsibility involves evaluating the relationship between a person and an outcome, and 
culpability involves evaluating the mental state of a person as she engaged in an action. 
Therefore if parental involvement laws are manifestations of parental blame, then sanc-
tions are imposed because of parental status and not because of specific behaviors that 
parents have done. Not requiring proof of specific blameworthy behaviors is in direct con-
trast to other laws directed at parents. Child neglect and abuse statutes, for example, typi-
cally impose liability upon parents only when they, through an act or omission to act, en-
dangered or harmed the child. 
Parental involvement laws essentially impose vicarious liability onto parents for the acts 
of their children. However, unlike other forms of vicarious liability situations where two 
parties may be linked only by a particular crime (e.g., accomplice or conspiratorial liability) 
or by a limited, consensual relationship (e.g., liability of employers for torts of employees 
during the course of employment), parental involvement laws expose parents to poten-
tially endless, unforeseen burdens. Parental involvement laws are predicated on the 
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premise that parents are to blame because of the parent-child relationship; no specific de-
finable action or inaction is required of the parents. 
Blame is a central feature of religious scriptures, ethics, moral philosophy, criminal law, 
and civil law (Robinson, 2002). Yet, the majority of empirical and theoretical attention has 
been devoted to the attribution of other-blame—that is, the ways in which others attribute 
blame to a wrongdoer. Newer but less frequent foci have been on self-blame and the effects 
(e.g., emotional or relational) of blame on the blame recipient. These new foci of blame 
research can prove important in evaluating the social appropriateness of blaming parents 
for the acts of their children. Each of these areas of blame research will be explored in this 
section and applied to the particular social appropriateness of parental involvement laws. 
 
Attributions of other-blame 
Read any news report or listen to friends discuss a tragic event and blame will likely be 
part of the story. Attributions of blame are at the forefront when a negative event occurs 
(Anderson, 1991; Shaver, 1985). However, despite blame’s ubiquity, it is somewhat unclear 
what blame is and what purpose it serves (Scanlon, 2008). Some theoretical explanations 
of blame attributions prescribe how an ideal rational actor should make judgments of blame. 
For example, in Shaver’s (1985) classic book, he outlines the five dimensions as: (1) the 
actor’s contribution to the harm (causality); (2) the actor’s awareness of the consequences 
of her action (knowledge); (3) the actor’s desire to bring about the consequence (intention-
ality); (4) the actor’s freedom (lack of coercion); and (5) the actor’s appreciation of the moral 
wrongfulness of the action. As each of these dimensions increases, so too should the attrib-
ution of blame. More recently, Alicke (2000) advanced a more contemporary and empiri-
cally supported culpable control model (Lagnado & Channon, 2008). In Alicke’s (2000) 
model, the attribution of blame is based on the two main processes: making spontaneous 
affective evaluations and assessing the actor’s personal control over the harmful outcome 
(blame validation). 
Research has demonstrated that a number of factors influence observers’ attribution of 
blame. The observer’s own characteristics (Rusinko, Bradley, & Miller, 2010; Stuewig 
Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010), ideologies (Sleath & Bull, 2010), and emo-
tions (Feigenson & Park, 2006; Kulik & Brown, 1979; Meier & Robinson, 2004;) influence 
the way people make blame judgments. Likewise, the actors’ motivations (Alicke, 2000), 
mental state (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004), 
social attractiveness (Alicke & Zell, 2009), and causal control (Alicke, 2000) influence the 
amount of blame attributed to them. Even characteristics of the situation such as severity 
of outcomes (Mazzocco et al., 2004), characteristics of victims (Cramer, Chandler, & Wake-
man, 2010), and social pressure on the actor (Tetlock, Self, & Singh, 2010) can influence the 
way people make blame attributions. Blame seems to serve the purpose of reassuring peo-
ple that they live in a “Just World” (Lerner, 1970); that is, people blame victims because of 
the belief that people get what they deserve (Lerner & Matthews, 1967). When we blame, 
we are appealing to some sort of justice—we are focusing on what someone ought to re-
ceive (Tilly, 2008). Yet, as Alicke (2008) notes, academics may generally agree with how to 
appropriate blame, but everyday blamers and our criminal justice system commonly vio-
late the scholarly definitional requirements. Alicke (2000, FN2) also notes that blame for 
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parents rests on the presumption that the parents have been ineffective or deleterious in 
their child-rearing and therefore worthy of blame for their child’s actions. Lawmakers have 
relied on this presumption to justify punishing parents for juvenile delinquency, but such 
reliance violates the scholarly definitional requirements of attributing blame. 
 
Attributions of self-blame 
Although attributions of other-blame is integral to understanding legislative reasoning for 
parental involvement laws, the laws’ appropriateness partially rests on the ways in which 
the parents self-blame. As the preceding section demonstrates, research and theoretical 
thought have often focused on attributions of blame that are directed by one person to 
another person; however, attributions of blame can also be self-directed. Self-blame, ac-
cording to attribution theory, allows a person to make causal attributions about a negative 
event, which may elicit a sense of control over that event and future events like it. Research 
findings are mixed; however, on whether self-blame leads to better adaptation. In certain 
instances, self-blame seems to lead to better outcomes (e.g., Affleck, Allen, Tennen, 
McGrade, & Ratzan, 1985; Bulman & Wortman, 1977), but in other similar situations self-
blame seems to lead to worse outcomes (e.g., Affleck et al., 1985; Branscombe,Wohl, Owen, 
Allison, & N’gbala, 2003; Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984). 
One potential explanation for the different outcomes is the distinction between behav-
ioral versus characterological self-blame that Janoff-Bulman first noted in 1979. As the 
terms suggest, behavioral self-blame results when the negative events are attributed to 
one’s behaviors—the specific actions or inactions. Inherent in this definition is that behav-
iors are modifiable and can be avoided in the future. Characterological self-blame results 
when the negative events are attributed to one’s character and are, therefore, essentially 
immutable. Similar to the way a person blames someone else, a person can blame himself 
behaviorally (as opposed to characterologically) as a way to control the potential repetition 
of the negative event. As an example, Tennen, Affleck, and Gershman (1986) asked moth-
ers of infants with severe medical problems about their infants’ health difficulties and their 
own self-blame for those difficulties. Each mother was also asked about her own blame for 
her infant’s recovery and future health issues. Mothers who behaviorally self-blamed dis-
played better mood-states. Explained through defensive attribution theory, these results 
indicate that as the severity of the illnessworsens, it becomes even more unpleasant to be-
lieve that the mother did not have control and that such misfortune could strike again in 
the future. Might juvenile delinquency be viewed similarly by parents? 
 
Transferring other-blame to self-blame 
Although considerable research and theoretical explanations exist on the attribution of 
blame, little to no research has examined whether other-blame can be successfully trans-
ferred into self-blame. The research dearth is even greater when the attribution is directed 
at a person, such as a parent, who may be vicariously responsible. Both foci are important 
in understanding everyday interactions that involve blame and are especially important in 
forming a theoretical foundation for empirically testing parental involvement laws. Deter-
mining how to shape blame in such a way as to encourage drive and agency without 
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undermining motivation is a “pressing question” for social psychology and philosophy 
(Springer, 2008, p. 413). 
Anderson (1991) notes that admissions or apologies, in contrast to excuses and justifica-
tions, may serve as behavioral indications of blame-acceptance and imply that the person 
has moved from being the target of other-blame to self-blame, but this has not yet been 
empirically tested. Parkinson and Illingworth (2009) examined other-blame and self-
blame, but for the purposes of guilt inducement. In a series of three small-sample diary 
and retrospective recall studies, Parkinson and Illingworth (2009) found guilt can result 
from other-blame even when self-blame is not present. Although Parkinson and Illing-
worth (2009) considered other- and self-blame together, their methodology was not in-
tended to examine information about whether and how a person would transform other-
blame to self-blame. Additionally, Kassin and Kiechel (1996) in their false confession par-
adigm showed a majority of participants who were presented with false incriminating ev-
idence accepted responsibility for “their” actions and about one-fourth actually internal-
ized the false evidence. 
Targets of blame (from other or self) will most often experience shame, guilt, anger, or 
indignation with shame and guilt leading to more positive and mutable outcomes (Bau-
meister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Van Vliet, 2009). Because other-blame inherently 
relates to a desire to reform the blame recipient (Williams, 2003), other-blame can benefit 
the recipient (target of blame) by communicating to the person being blamed that she is a 
legitimate candidate for change (Holroyd, 2007). But people seem to try to avoid blame 
even when there is no potential for punishment (Anderson, 1991). This may be because 
blame is inherently commingled with control, which can easily lead to undermining moti-
vation for the person being blamed (Springer, 2008). Because intrinsic motivation depends 
upon feeling competent and autonomous, evaluative feedback, such as blame, can backfire 
if it results in the recipient feeling less competent or less autonomous (Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
Further, Robinson (2002) posits that if not done correctly, the person being blamed may 
become angry and indignant. 
For the purpose of parental involvement laws, can other blame be transferred into more 
useful and adaptive self-blame (whether behavioral or characterological)? It is clear that 
attributions of other-blame are wielded within parental involvement laws, but to what re-
sult? In our next section, we address the question of whether parental involvement laws 
are efficacious. 
 
Effectiveness of Parental Involvement Laws 
 
Psychology and criminology theorists purport that parents do have an influence in their 
children’s criminal behaviors, but there is also a strong influence of peers and environmen-
tal factors (Weijters, Scheepers, & Gerris, 2009). Moreover, research has focused on models 
to predict delinquency, not interventions that blame parents. Not only has this type of in-
tervention been empirically neglected, but the courts have noted this neglect (Maple 
Heights v. Ephraim, 2008). As social scientists we often advocate evidence-based legal de-
cision making (Boruch, 2005), but with parental involvement laws we have very little ger-
mane to the questions of their effectiveness. Despite their popularity among lawmakers, 
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we know an inappreciable amount about the effects of vicarious blaming; such paucity in 
the research suggests this area, and the policy implications that follow, is ripe for empirical 
examination. 
Empirical research on the general topic of parental responsibility laws has been limited 
at best. Much of the work done at this point has focused on the legal analysis of the laws 
(Brank et al., 2005; DiFonzo, 2001; Thurman, 2003), enforcement frequency (Harris, 2006), 
or public opinion of the laws. Such public opinion research has demonstrated that the laws 
are not as widely supported by the general public as the political pundits and policy mak-
ers would argue (Brank & Weisz, 2004; White, Augoustinos, & Taplin, 2007). 
Brank and Weisz (2004) conducted a large-scale nationally representative survey about 
issues related to parental responsibility laws. The survey results demonstrated that re-
spondents generally place a great deal of responsibility on the juveniles and are not that 
enthusiastic in their desires to blame or punish parents. Consistent with other global ver-
sus specific research, Brank, Hays, and Weisz (2006) found that participants were more 
reluctant to support the notion of parental responsibility when there are specific juveniles 
and parents described than when they are asked generally about the topic. In a series of 
three studies, Brank, Greene, and Hochevar (2011) examined the impact of various situa-
tional and dispositional factors on public opinion regarding parental responsibility. Most 
responsibility was placed on the child, with attributions of responsibility on the parents 
decreasing as the described juvenile’s age increased. Other factors such as the type of crime 
and the parents’ described actions did not consistently influence responsibility attributions 
(Brank et al., 2011). Adjudicated delinquent juveniles also tend not to support the notions 
of parental responsibility and blame. Brank and Lane (2008) interviewed adjudicated de-
linquent youth living in residential facilities and found that a vast majority of the youth 
said their parents were not responsible for their crimes. 
No widespread and empirically sound research has examined the use and effectiveness 
of parental responsibility laws, but some related research has demonstrated that an inten-
sive probation program focused on improving parent-child relationships did not signifi-
cantly improve key family relationship measures (Brank, Lane, Turner, Fain, & Sehgal, 
2008). We suggest and describe later in this section that vicarious blame and transferring 
other-blame into self-blame provides a theoretical framework from which to test their legal 
viability. 
One luxury of parental involvement laws that other forms of correction do not have is 
that these are not the primary disposition for a juvenile. This makes it relatively easy to 
randomly assign some parents to sanctions and others not. With judicial willingness and 
involvement, we could conduct controlled experiments with random assignment that 
would allow for relatively clear comparisons. For instance, consider a Jacksonville, Florida 
ordinance (Children’s Curfew, 2006) that allows parents to be fined $100 when one of their 
children breaks the city’s curfew, but permits the parents to either go to a parenting class 
or do community service in lieu of the fine. Two of the stated purposes are to: “[P]rotect 
the children from the dangers of violent crimes which occur on and in the sidewalks, 
streets, public places and other places accessible to the public during late night hours 
throughout the city” and “[P]rotect the persons of this City from the dangers of violent 
crime committed by children on the sidewalks, streets, public places, and other places 
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accessible to the public during late night hours.” The Jacksonville ordinance only added 
the parental component to their existing curfew ordinance, which would easily allow for 
pre- and postimplementation comparisons. 
The types of parental sanctions also provide a natural way to manipulate manifestations 
of blame. Parents could be randomly assigned to receive one of the three sanction options 
or no sanction at all. The community service and fine sanctions suggest a characterological 
blame strategy, whereas the parenting class suggests behavioral blame. With city cooper-
ation even more in-depth blame manipulations would be possible such that parents are 
explicitly blamed in either a characterological or behavioral way. In addition to simple 
comparisons of rates of delinquent behavior, interviews with parents could be modeled 
after research that has examined mothers’ self-blame for their infants’ health (Tennen et 
al., 1986). Such interviews would allow researchers to probe into the parents’ causal attrib-
utions and self-blame for their child’s delinquency, their judgments of personal control 
and self-blame over future offenses, and their belief about avoidance of similar delin-
quency in their other children. This would be especially important and telling if done in 
conjunction with random assignment to the different parental sanctions. 
Additional methodologies, such as propensity score matching (PSM) statistical tech-
niques (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), could prove useful in communities where controlled 
experiments are not feasible. PSM would allow researchers to statistically identify similar 
groups of juveniles and their parents (Hill, Waldfogel, Brooks-Gunn, & Han, 2005) while 
decreasing selection bias. Even quasi-experimental designs would prove useful in building 
the beginnings of a knowledge base about these laws. Methods such as interrupted time 
series designs (Ferron & Rendina-Gobioff, 2005) for cities that allowed access to juveniles, 
but not random assignment; or regression-discontinuity design when juvenile court judges 
want “specific” parents to get the “treatment” of the parental sanctions (Thistlethwaite & 
Campbell, 1960)  
We chose to focus our empirical review on the notion of blame, but clearly there are 
other areas with important implications for developing a comprehensive empirical review 
of parental involvement laws. For instance, the social psychological principles of reward 
and punishment (Greitemeyer & Weiner, 2008) seem particularly relevant, as does the 
work on extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation (Ginsburg & Bronstein, 1993). Despite these 
and other potential areas of inquiry, the theoretical models of other- and self-blame pro-




At this point, it is unclear whether parental responsibility laws are an appropriate legal 
response to juvenile delinquency. The parent-child relationship is deeply rooted in our 
societal history and the U.S. juvenile system clearly attempted to mirror that relationship 
in creation of the juvenile court and capitalize on the relationship with the imposition of 
parental involvement laws. The question remains whether such vicarious blame that ac-
companies parental involvement laws are an empirically and legally valid response to ju-
venile delinquency. 
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Psychology and criminology research indicates that parents should and do play a role 
in the upbringing of a socially competent child, but no research has yet confirmed that the 
policy of imposing postcrime blame for parents’ behaviors or character will have any pos-
itive influence on juvenile crime. The fictional mother in Peter Shaffer’s play Equus pro-
vides a poignant conclusion to our inquiry. Her brief monologue exemplifies not only the 
distraught parental response to a child’s crime, but also the way that the parent-child rela-
tionship has permeated our laws and our culture. The mother responds to the psychia-
trist’s inquiries: 
 
And me? What about me? What do you think I am? I’m a parent, of course—so 
it doesn’t count. That’s a dirty word in here, isn’t it, ‘parent.’ . . . I’ve heard it all 
my life. It’s our fault. Whatever happens, we did it . . .We’re not criminals.We’ve 
done nothing wrong.We loved Alan. We gave him the best love we could . . . No, 
doctor. Whatever’s happened has happened because of Alan. Alan is himself. 
Every soul is itself. If you added up everything we ever did to him, from his first 
day on earth to this, you wouldn’t find why he did this terrible thing—because 
that’s him: not just all of our things added up . . . (Shaffer, 1974, p. 77). 
 
Our belief is that as a society we will not be able to answer this fictional mother’s ques-
tions and respond to her statements until we have adequately tested the behavioral as-
sumptions imposed by parental involvement laws. 
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